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Introduction
In E.P. Odum’s (1969) discussion of the de-
velopment of ecosystems through their “lifetime,”
he makes it a point to focus part of his discussion
on human ecosystems.  Noting bioecology’s his-
torical omission of humans from ecosystem analy-
sis, he called for a form of ecosystem analysis that
considers humans as a part of, not apart from, na-
ture.  The recognized role of humans in ecosystem
analysis has not changed much since then.  Bio-
ecologists continue to treat humans as external to
their notion of system, searching for “undisturbed”
and “pristine” ecosystems in which to conduct ba-
sic research.  By focusing on the negative effects of
humans on ecological processes, ecologists continue
to reinforce the idea that humans are not “natural”
biological or ecological entities.
Some attempts have been made to integrate
humans into ecosystem analysis, but progress
among bioecologists is slow.  Within conservation
and applied ecology there are attempts to integrate
humans into ecological systems.  A recent book
(McDonnell and Pickett 1993) reports a confer-
ence in which researchers approached humans as
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Abstract
Anthropology and bioecology are currently at a point in their development where researchers in both fields
are working towards an integration, which can be described as a form of human ecology.  Integration of such
disparate disciplines is not easily achieved.  Important steps which facilitate integration are the clear defini-
tion of terms relevant to the disciplines, and the development of a common framework which would allow
the overlapping of domains of the disciplines.  The objective of this paper is to contribute to an understand-
ing of human ecosystems by discussing (1) the definition of human ecosystems, and (2) the use of models in
illustrating the integration of bio-physical and socio-cultural components of human ecosystems.  Icons from
the systems modeling languages of H.T. Odum and J.M. Forrester are applied to the modeling of human
ecosystems.  Specifically, models of R.A. Rappaport’s work with the Tsembaga Maring are discussed in terms
of their depiction of the components of human ecosystems.  Modeling allows one to conceptualize the com-
plexity of human ecosystems, and is an important step towards a human ecology.
components of ecosystems.  The National Science
Foundation has recently provided funding to es-
tablish Phoenix and Baltimore as Long Term Eco-
logical Research (LTER) sites, where the city itself
is treated as an ecosystem.  So, bioecologists are
beginning to consider humans to be ecological
entities, not simply external disturbance factors.
Cultural anthropologists, beginning with the
cultural ecology of Steward (1949) and White
(1949) attempted to develop ecological models of
human systems. Although these models included
energy and (implicitly) matter, they tended to ex-
clude much of the non-human environment. Like
bioecology, they also tended to avoid addressing
the need to model information. Other cultural
anthopologists, like Rappaport (1968), and arche-
ologists (cf. Flannery 1968, Kowalewski et al.
1983), attempted to formalize the modeling of
human systems, but this approach began to lose
favor by the early 1990s. Current biocultural and
life-history approaches (cf. McElroy 1990, Hill
1993) have tended to downplay the systems ap-
proach and limited the scope of analysis to a few
key variables. If our goal is to gain a complete and
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useful understanding of human ecology, we still
need to develop approaches that incorporate
human systems, the non-human environments,
and the ephemeral nature of information in
human decision making and non-human eco-
logical function.
 In this paper, I attempt to integrate several
concepts and ideas that contribute to our un-
derstanding of human ecosystems.  I will begin
by defining some terms relevant to human ecol-
ogy.  Then I briefly discuss some shortcomings
of the bioecological treatment of humans.  Lastly,
I discuss the role that modeling can play in work-
ing toward an integration of the  physical, bio-
logical, social, and cultural components of hu-
man ecosystems.
Ecosystems and Environments
In the development of a scientific theory, an
important step is the definition of core concepts
(Pickett et al. 1994).  Imprecise thought and the
use of jargon as an intellectual crutch reduces con-
fidence and limits communication (Pickett et al.
1994). The clear definition of terminology re-
duces confusion.  This section defines what can
be considered a core concept of human ecology,
the ecosystem.
In 1935, Tansley introduced the ecosystem
as a holistic concept: “the more fundamental con-
ception is . . . the whole system (in the sense of
physics), including not only the organism-complex,
but the whole complex of physical factors forming
what we call the environment of the biome–the
FIGURE 1. THE INPUT ENVIRONMENT. (Modified from Andrewartha and Birch 1984.)
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habitat factors in the widest sense.”  Tansley (1935)
considered the ecosystem to be the basic unit of
nature.  The ecosystem can be used to conceptu-
ally integrate other levels in the hierarchy of bio-
logical organization (Allen and Hoekstra 1992),
and can also be treated as a fundamental unit of
analysis for human ecology.
The environment of an ecosystem is another
concept, which has been defined and redefined in
the past 50 years, and thereby affects the way one
defines the ecosystem.  For example, the input
environment of Andrewartha and Birch (1984)
includes all the biotic and abiotic factors which
influence an organism’s ability to survive and re-
produce (Figure 1).  This conception of environ-
ment is limiting because it ignores connections
between ecosystems.
Patten (1978) has defined the environment
to include both the inputs and outputs of the sys-
tem.  The output environment includes all energy,
matter, and information that leaves the system, and
influences other ecosystems (Figure 2).  According
to Patten (1978) the ecosystem is defined as made
up of the system, the input environment, and out-
put environment of the system.  In a sense, the
system is a locus in the environment.  Addition of
the output environment integrates the influences
that organisms have on their environments, en-
abling concepts that include coevolving organisms
and environments, such as the Gaia hypothesis
(Lovelock 1987).  Patten’s definition of ecosystem
can be considered a complete definition. Without
the output environment, only the system, and not
the ecosystem, is being analyzed.
FIGURE 2. ENVIRONMENT AND ECOSYSTEM.
There are two environments, an input environment and an output environment, defined by the
focal animal or system; altogether they define the ecosystem: IE+S+OE=ECOSYSTEM (Re-
drawn from Odum 1983; concept based on Patten 1978).
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Previous definitions of environment have in-
cluded only physical and biological components.
When the ecosystem in question is a human eco-
system, there are additional layers of complexity
to the environment.  Humans exist in cultural and
social environments as well as physical and bio-
logical environments (Figure 3).  Accordingly, a
human ecosystem is defined as an ecological sys-
tem that includes humans and has multiple (physi-
cal, biological, social, and cultural) input and out-
put environments which link to other ecosystems.
Since ecosystems are defined as any system
with input and output environments, ecosystems
can be defined at any spatial scale: thus, the eco-
system is a transcalar concept.  The multiple envi-
ronments of human ecosystems can be arranged
in a spatially scaled hierarchy, so that human eco-
systems can be located anywhere from the level of
organisms and families up to the level of nations
and world systems (Figure 4).
A distinction can now be drawn between the
ecosystem and system approach.  The system ap-
proach can explain the functioning of the internal
system components through networks, nodes, flows,
and linkages.  The ecosystem approach includes an
analysis of the system components, as well as the
relation of the system to components in its input
and output environments.  Human ecosystem analy-
sis can be defined simply: the study of ecosystems (a
system with an input and output environment) that
contain humans as components of the system, not
merely the input and/or output environment(s).
FIGURE 3. PARTIAL THEORY OF MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTS.
The input-output structure and concept of filters follow Patten. The hierarchy of spheres is an
evolutionary arrangement of the environments; other arrangements are possible (Stepp 1999).
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FIGURE 4. MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTS CONCEPT APPLIED TO A SCALED HIERARCHY OF HUMAN ECOSYSTEMS.
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Bioecological Approach To Humans
In addition to its treatment of humans as
unnatural and external disturbance factors, two
other criticisms of the bioecological approach to
considering humans can be offered: the limited
conception of environment and the lack of proper
consideration of the role of information flows.
All three shortcomings contribute to an incom-
plete understanding of human ecology within the
discipline of bioecology.  The concept of envi-
ronment within bioecology is, in general, incom-
plete and insufficient to allow an understanding
of human ecosystems.  Recognition of the fact
that, as ecological entities, humans operate not
only in physical and biological environments, but
also cultural and social environments, can lead to
a theoretical framework that will allow bioecolo-
gists to gain a more complete understanding of
the nature of human ecosystems.
The role of information in human ecosys-
tems sets them apart from ecosystems that are tra-
ditionally studied within bioecology (Stepp
1999).  But, bioecological attempts to understand
human ecosystems have for the most part ignored
this important component.  For example, Figure
5 is an energy model of Maori culture by H.T.
Odum (1983), and Figure 6 is a diagram of the
input environment of hunter-gatherers by
Andrewartha and Birch (1984).  Both diagrams
focus on the physical and biological components,
ignoring the role that information has in gener-
ating the patterns and processes seen in the hu-
man ecosystems in question.
Visualizing Human Ecosystems Through
Models
Integration of the cultural and social facets
of humanity with the physical and biological com-
ponents traditionally studied in bioecology is not
easy.  One stumbling block is the lack of overlap of
the domains of the disciplines and the lack of a
common theoretical framework (see Pickett et al.
1994).  One starting point for integration would
be a common framework of ecosystem modeling.
Modeling is an appropriate place to begin to inte-
grate the two disciplinary approaches because mod-
els serve as conceptual tools in the formulation of
theories, helping one to visualize the patterns and
processes of the ecosystems being represented.  In
this section I discuss a framework which has been
used to model human ecosystems (Stepp 1999) and
use this framework to discuss the modeling of
Rappaport’s work with the Tsembaga Maring
(1968, 1984).
The human ecosystems (information ecology)
group at UGA has been adapting the modeling
approach of H.T. Odum to incorporate the role of
information in human ecosystems (cf. Zarger 1998,
Jones 1999, Stepp 1999).  To illustrate this ap-
proach, I have applied it to a simplification of  H.T.
Odum’s (1983) model of the aggregated US
economy (Figure 7), while including the concept
of input/output environments and information
flows.  The input environment for the US is com-
posed of climate, water flows, geologic materials,
and most notably, the output environments from
other nations and regions of the world (Figures 8
and 9).  The output environment of the US
economy becomes the input environments of the
other nations of the world.  The quality and quan-
tity of the flows composing the output and input
environments in the diagram will vary depending
upon the nation in question, as well as the point
in time that the model is applied.
In order to build on past modeling concepts
to better represent information, a new symbol has
been introduced with this model, being a combi-
nation of H.T. Odum and Forrester modeling sym-
bols.  A difference between Forrester’s and Odum’s
modeling approaches is how their respective sym-
bols are informed by the other components of the
system (Figures 10 and 11).   H.T. Odum’s inter-
action represents simply the coupling and inter-
section of flows (Figure 10a).  Forrester’s valves,
on the other hand, receive information flows from
system components which make up the decision
function and affect the flow through the valve (Fig-
ure 10b).  H.T. Odum’s interaction involves an
implicit informing by system components and logi-
cal operations, while Forrester’s valve requires the
37Pavao-Zuckerman / Models in Human EcologyVol. 4 2000
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FIGURE 10B. FORRESTER MODELING LANGUAGE.
Decision functions are used to determine the rates of flows (valves).  The valve receives information
flows (dashed lines) from system components. Information flows make up the decision function and
affect the material flows through the valve.  The basic enclosure symbols are levels, which indicate the
state of a variable.
FIGURE 10A.  H.T. ODUM MODELING LANGUAGE.
The enclosure symbols (e.g., producer and consumer) have dual functions, both transforming flows, and the
storage of inputs minus outputs.  Symbols such as the interaction also modify flow rates.  The modification
of flows and rates involves implicit informing and logical operation by system components.
FIGURE 10C.  ODUM-FORRESTER HYBRID.
This new symbol incorporates the explicit role of information used in Forrester models, with the enclo-
sure symbols of H.T. Odum.  This hybrid symbol both receives information flows from the system com-
ponents, and uses this information to modify other flows (e.g., energy or matter) through the enclosure
symbol (note the curvy-dashed line indicates the flow of information and matter/energy).
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explicit modeling of information transfer between
system components.  Since Forrester’s models op-
erate without implicit logic and with explicit in-
formation flows, his valve symbol would more
clearly indicate the decision making role of Odum’s
consumer/producer symbol, so the two symbols
have been merged (Figure 10c).
With a framework for modeling human eco-
systems in hand, we can now turn to a classic study
from human ecology.  Rappaport’s (1968) work
with the Tsembaga Maring of New Guinea can be
used to illustrate the potential that this framework
for human ecosystem modeling has for integrat-
ing the cultural, social, biological, and physical
components of human ecosystems.  In Pigs for the
Ancestors, Rappaport reported on a small tribe that
practiced swidden agriculture on about 1000 acres
of arable forest land, of which about 100 acres was
in garden at any time.  Forests were cleared by burn-
ing, used for a year or two, and then as productiv-
ity began to decline, were left fallow. The Tsembaga
women also practiced pig husbandry, the pork pro-
viding an important protein supplement. Pigs were
slaughtered at many ritual occasions. The festival
was triggered by the perception of the pig popula-
tion increasing to the point at which they are con-
suming too much of the Tsembaga’s garden crops.
The kaiko was an important event in the Tsembaga
ritual cycle, consisting of the ritual slaughter of
most of the pigs and the sharing of pork with one’s
allies. After allies were given  pork the rumbim (a
sacred plant) was uprooted, indicating that the
ritual taboo on warfare was lifted. Neighbors then
went into active conflict, which ended after both
sides sustained a few casualties. The cycle was com-
pleted by the planting of rumbim, signifying that
the taboo on warfare once again stood (see also
Appendix A).
FIGURE 11. WORLD MODEL OF POPULATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES SHOWN IN BOTH FORRESTER AND
H.T. ODUM MODELING LANGUAGES (from Odum 1983).  (Note that the model has been over-simpli-
fied by H.T. Odum from the original Forrester model.)
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Rappaport described the Tsembaga popula-
tion as being self-regulated.  He proposed that
the interplay of the pig population and the ritual
cycle served to keep the Tsembaga population at
a level which did not overshoot the carrying ca-
pacity of the biophysical environment.  The hu-
man ecosystem of the Tsembaga is characterized
by the cycling of the human population, cycling
of the pig population, and the ritual cycle.  Peri-
odic warfare regulated the Tsembaga population,
while the pig populations served as an uncon-
scious information monitor for this population
regulation (Shantzis and Behrens 1973).
Several models of Rappaport’s work have been
constructed since Pigs for the Ancestors was first pub-
lished.  Padoch (1973) used H.T. Odum-type en-
ergy model language to run computer simulations
of the relation between human population, pig
population, festival, and warfare in the Tsembaga
ecosystem (Figure 12a).  These simulations resulted
in cycles similar to those proposed by Rappaport.
Shantzis and Behrens (1973) used Forrester-type
information computer model simulations to show
that human populations can by regulated by the
ritual warfare, which in turn is informed by the pig
population cycling (Figure 12b).  Again, these simu-
lations produced cycles similar to those proposed
by Rappaport.
Other computer model simulations have
been constructed to challenge the notion that
human populations can be self-regulated, as hy-
pothesized by Rappaport, and confirmed through
simulation by the model of Shantzis and Behrens
(1973).  Samuels (1982) constructed a computer
simulation model which included the effect of
disease epidemics on the Tsembaga populations.
His computer simulation results indicated that
the role of the ritual cycle as a regulator was not
valid when the effects of disease epidemics were
included in the simulation models.  Foin and
Davis (1984, 1987) then adapted the model of
Shantzis and Behrens (1973) to run simulations,
as they also did not agree with Rappaport’s sug-
gestion that ritual had a self-regulatory role in the
Tsembaga ecosystem.  In their first paper (1984)
they questioned the choice of parameter values used
by Shantzis and Behrens (1973).  Running the
model with what they considered to be more real-
istic parameters, the ritual cycle played no role in
regulating the ecosystem.  In their second paper
(1987) they compared models of local stability (i.e.,
the Tsembaga are self-regulated), regional stability
(i.e. local populations are unstable, but there is al-
ways a population existing at the broader scale),
and disequilibrium (there is no stability at all).
Again, the model of Shantzis and Behrens (1973)
was used to simulate local stability (Figure 12c).
In this second paper, Foin and Davis (1987) found
that depending on the scale of perspective one
takes, it is possible for the disequilibrium model
to best represent the Tsembaga ecosystem.
So, computer models have shown that the
Tsembaga are both (1) self-regulated, with ritual
warfare playing a central role, as hypothesized by
Rappaport, and (2) not self-regulated by ritual, and
even out of equilibrium.  What then are we to take
away from this discussion of models of the
Tsembaga ecosystem?
First, models are nothing more than simpli-
fications of complex systems.  The nature of this
simplification depends upon the version of reality
that the modeler wishes to describe (Levins 1966).
Model simulations are never “true,” but can only
be taken as far as the nature of the model allows
(Taylor 2000).  As we have seen in the previous
discussion, whether or not a modeler believes
Rappaport’s hypothesized self-regulation influences
the nature of the model that is constructed and
the parameter values that fill it.  Therefore, the
models can not be judged as tests of Rappaport’s
hypothesis.  The models are representations of real
systems, and can only be tested to see if they are
internally consistent with what the modeler is try-
ing to represent.  In other words, a model is not an
ecosystem, and an ecosystem is not a model.
Second, what modeling does have to offer is
utility as a learning tool.  Models have value in
understanding complex systems in that the pro-
cess of constructing them allows one to gain a per-
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FIGURE 12. COMPUTER SIMULATION MODELS OF THE TSEMBAGA ECOSYSTEM. (12a, Padoch 1973; 12b,
Shantzis and Behrens 1973; 12c, Foin and Davis 1987.)
12C.
12B.
12A.
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spective on the connections and complex causali-
ties of these systems (Levin 1966, Taylor 2000).
Models therefore have a role to play as conceptual
tools for understanding the complexity of human
ecosystems.
To expand on this second point, I have ap-
plied the modeling approach developed at UGA
(see Zarger 1998, Jones 1999, Stepp 1999) to the
Tsembaga Maring as described by Rappaport.  This
modeling exercise was conducted to illustrate how
information flows and stores are integrated into a
cybernetic human ecosystem, rather than trying
to illustrate the self-regulatory properties of the
Tsembaga ecosystem.  A system is cybernetic if it
has feedback, where the input environment of the
system is determined to some extent by the output
environment of the system.  Cybernetic systems
are often assumed to have goals which drive sys-
tem behavior, such as the temperature at which
one sets a thermostat.  However, Patten and Odum
(1981) described ecosystems which are cybernetic,
but do not operate via teleological goal functions.
The behavior of these systems is determined by
past causes, and “the interplay of material cycles
and energy flows, under informational control,
generates self-organizing feedbacks with no discrete
controller required” (Patten and Odum 1981: 888).
Flows from certain subsystems may steer other sub-
systems without the ecosystem as a whole being
teleological.  Extending this emergent property to
the Tsembaga ecosystem, the question one should
then be asking is how the components of this
ecosystem are integrated such that self-organized
feedbacks arise.  Modelers seeking to find how the
Tsembaga ecosystem regulates the population
growth of humans at some optimal level are asking
a false question.  What the Tsembaga example al-
lows us to understand is how the physical, biologi-
cal, social, and cultural components of human eco-
systems can be integrated.
The first model (Figure 13) consists only of
the biological and physical components of the eco-
system.  The forest and gardens draw energy from
the sun and nutrients from the soil.  The garden
and forest are linked by the process of shifting cul-
tivation.  Energy flows from the gardens to the pigs,
and from the gardens and pigs to the human popu-
lation.  This model is incomplete, because it leaves
us asking: what steers the flow of energy from the
pigs to the Tsembaga; what steers the shifting cul-
tivation which links forest and gardens; what steers
the growth of the human population; and how are
the social and cultural characteristics of the
Tsembaga integrated into this ecosystem?
To address these questions, the second model
(Figure 14) includes the role of information flow
in the form of the ritual cycle, using the Odum-
Forrester hybrid symbol introduced above (Figure
10c).  The ritual cycle itself is depicted as an expo-
nential delay within a system, and represents the
merging of several levels and flow rates which com-
pose the delay function (Forrester 1961).  The de-
lay is informed by the perception of the impact of
the pig population on the gardens.  When this in-
formation accumulates to a certain point (where
the women notice it and complain) the ritual cycle
produces warfare.  The ritual cycle delay is also
informed by the results of the warfare, and when
casualties are considered to be sufficient, the ritual
cycle produces a truce.  The flow of pig protein to
the Tsembaga is also informed by the ritual cycle
delay.  Notice that the shifting of land between
forest and garden is controlled by the perceived
swidden productivity.  This productivity is in-
formed by both the amount of food produced and
the human population size (in effect, food per
capita).  The human population size is affected by
the casualties sustained during warfare, and it is
here that the ritual cycle integrates with the dy-
namics of the Tsembaga population and their im-
pact on the forests that provide land for their
swidden agriculture.
Figure 14 shows a conceptualization of
Rappaport’s self-regulation hypothesis in the
Tsembaga Maring ecosystem. The model illus-
trates how the biophysical and sociocultural
components of the ecosystem may integrate to
produce self-organized feedback mechanisms.
The model also illustrates the role that informa-
tion flows have in this system.  Previous models
have a more static conceptualization of the rela-
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FIGURE 13. BIOPHYSICAL MODEL OF THE TSEMBAGA ECOSYSTEM. (See Appendix B for a key to
symbols.)
tionship between pigs, festival, and warfare; the
ritual cycle just happened because it was
preprogrammed into the simulations.  The
model developed here depicts how information
is transmitted and processed in such a way that
the ritual cycle comes about.  It falls short of
Rappaport’s diagrammatic model (Figure 15) in
the second (enlarged) edition of his book (1984),
in the sense that he reveals a higher level of in-
formation flow in also depicting the spirit world
as it plays a role in the system.  Comparing
Rappaport’s model with the model here suggests
that another generation of modeling could carry
the Forrester method further to accommodate
even more of the information causality in the
Tsembaga system.2
2 See Appendix A for an example of modeling Rappaport’s Maring systems from a primarily informational/belief
systems perspective.
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Conclusion
 With conceptual models of human ecosys-
tems in hand, one can pose questions which re-
quire the overlapping of anthropological and bio-
ecological frameworks into a human ecology.  In-
tegration between theories and disciplines is made
easier if the components one wishes to integrate
are broad (Pickett et al. 1994). Examples of broad
integrative questions for human ecology include:
How do complex belief systems interact
with complex biophysical systems?
Do social and cultural systems exhibit dy-
namics similar to the dynamics which have
been described for biophysical ecosystems?
What are constraining/affording impli-
cations for human ecosystems if the dy-
namics of physical, biological, social, and
cultural phenomena are not similar?
Once again, the integration into a human
ecology is aided by the use of clearly defined con-
cepts and terminology.  This paper has defined the
core concepts of  the human ecosystem and its
environments.  The ecosystem concept is useful
for human ecology because it allows researchers to
follow many conceptual approaches (such as popu-
lation dynamics, community interactions, systems
analysis) within the overarching framework of the
human ecosystem.  The construction of models is
an important tool in achieving integration between
diverse disciplines such as anthropology and bio-
ecology.  Both fields work with extremely complex
systems.  The formulation of visual representations
of the components and networks of linkages of
these complex systems is a useful tool for concep-
tualizing this complexity.  In particular, models can
help one grasp the complexity of the role of infor-
mation in human ecosystems.  Visualizing the com-
ponents and connections, one can begin to see
where biophysical and sociocultural phenomena
interact, and where they do not.  However, build-
ing a picture of complex systems is only the begin-
ning of building an integrated human ecology.
Modeling techniques need to be refined, and new
icons may need to be devised (as this paper illus-
trates).  Once models of human ecosystems have
been developed, the next step will be to
operationalize integrated research to test hypoth-
eses and evaluate linkages between biophysical and
sociocultural phenomena.
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This adaptation of Rappaport’s Maring Eco-
system model (Figure A1, next page) showcases
the role of belief system interaction with other
systems. It follows Rappaport (1984) in organi-
zation and in content (Figure 15), with the verti-
cal column of triggers (T) and rituals (R) form-
ing the basis for the Maring ritual cycle, which
“regulates” the ecosystem. The Maring ecosystem
is divided into three general panels or systems,
the “Spirit World,” at left, “Inter-Group Rela-
tions,” upper right, and “Local Subsistence,” lower
right. “The Ritual Cycle” mediates, and in this
model, works the interactions between systems.
First, a guided reading of the system panels.
The Spirit World is dyadic. Two kinds of
spirits exist in dialectical (usually harmonic) op-
position to each other (high vs. low, smoke vs.
rot, dry vs. wet, strength vs. death, etc.). The Red
Spirits and the Spirits of Rot are associated, re-
spectively, with Smoke Woman (a female spirit
in the male domain) and Koipa Mangian (a male
spirit in female domain). The low ground is asso-
ciated with women, female genitalia, fertility and
gardens, while the high ground harbors the fierce
spirits that are called upon during war and con-
flict. The focal point of interest in Maring ritual
is in the interaction between these two kinds of
spirits (dialectical spiral middle left) and atten-
dant segregation/integration of the world. War-
fare forces the two spirit factions apart, increas-
ing the scope of taboo: men and women are
kept apart, the spirits’ “pigs” (marsupials and eels)
are restricted and actions must be taken by the
living to reintegrate the world through ritual.
Inter-Group Relations primarily shows
conflict and truce relationships with neighboring
populations, a necessary part of the whole. The
local shaman receives information and strength
from Smoke Woman, which he passes on to war-
riors. In turn, men killed in battle (skull sink)
join the ranks of the Red Spirits, completing a
feedback loop of information and (spiritual) ma-
terial. Likewise, those people that die of illness or
accident become Spirits of Rot; these in turn feed-
back to increase the fertility of swidden gardens
in support of pig and human populations.
Starting at the top of the ritual cycle, a
vengeance requirement is incurred from some of-
fense (a murder or fighting death), which triggers
the hanging of the Fighting Stones. This leads to
ritual segregation and the assumption of debt to the
Spirits. Taboos are assumed, restricting warrior and
women’s actions and making warfare tenable. With
too many deaths, rumbim is planted, which reduces
debt and segregation. Taboos are reduced, influenc-
ing interactions between men and women and fa-
cilitating truce with fighting neighbors, and so on
through the cycle until it is complete, a further ven-
geance requirement is incurred, and it begins again.
Because pigs are killed throughout the cycle, and
they are needed in sufficient numbers to repay the
debts owed to the spirits, they are a regulatory point
in the biophysical systems.
Appendix A: The Role of Complex Information Flows in a Maring Ecosystem (excerpted from Felice
Wyndham, unpublished manuscript).
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FIGURE A1. COMPLEX INFORMATION FLOWS IN A MARING ECOSYSTEM. (See Appendix B
for a key to some of the signs, icons and symbols used here.)
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Appendix B: Key to Human Ecosystems Models.
Based on H. T. Odum (1983, Systems Ecology, New York: John Wiley and Sons) and conventions
established by the Information Ecology Group of the Anthropology Department, University of
Georgia.
energy source,
outside system
information source -
beliefs, etc.
energy producer -
primarily plants
consumer - transforms
energy or information
organized group of
consumers, or
institutions
energy
pathway/flow
flow of
materials
geographic movement
of individuals/groups
dialectical field
portal - links to
greater detail, or
other sites
interaction - two paths
connected and
producing new outflow;
workgate
switch - selects
possible results
change or 
transformation - of
energy or information
storage - stores
matter, energy or 
information to
balance flows
transaction - 
exchange of one
thing for another
comparator - 
compares incoming
energy, matter, or
information before
creating an output
information
pathway/flow
propaganda -
to promote
something
information
field/filter/
screen/editor
sink
